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Empirical studies of intrahousehold allocation have revealed that, in many
instances, gender is an important determinant in the allocation of resources
within the household. For developing countries, in particular, the literature
has produced evidence of systematic differences between genders in the alloca-
tion of resources relating to nutrition, health, and education ðsee, e.g., Haddad,
Hoddinott, and Alderman ½1998 and Duflo ½2005 for reviews of this litera-
tureÞ.
Furthermore, the literature has provided extensive evidence that the initial
distribution of resources between men and women often affects household
outcomes, thus leading to the discrediting of the “Unitary Model” of the house-
hold. Evidence on imperfect risk sharing within the household ðDercon and
Krishnan 2000; Duflo and Udry 2003; Dubois and Ligon 2009Þ and on in-
efficiency in the allocation of productive resources within the household ðUdry
1996; Goldstein and Udry 2008Þ has also led to the discrediting of the “Col-
lective Model” of the household ðBrowning and Chiappori 1998Þ, which posits
that, regardless of the distribution of resources within the household, the allo-
cation is efficient. In light of this evidence, the theoretical literature has recently
turned its attention to possible constraints that can prevent an efficient outcome
within the household and, in particular, to models of dynamic bargaining ex-
hibiting lack of commitment ðLigon 2002; Lundberg and Pollak 2003; Basu
2006Þ.
Yet, within the theoretical literature on intrahousehold allocation, why gender
matters within the household remains an open question. The aforementionedWe are grateful to Chris Udry, Marcel Fafchamps, Sonia Bhalotra, and two anonymous referees for
their advice and feedback on an earlier version of the article. The data used in this study were
collected by a project funded by the Canadian Agency for International Development and conducted
by the University of Ouagadougou ðBurkina FasoÞ and Laval University ðQuebec, CanadaÞ. We
thank Taladidia Thiombiano and Frederic Martin for making the data available.
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540 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Emodels treat the household as a collection of agents with possibly conflicting
preferences, but it makes no distinction between the genders.
In this article we propose a simple model of intrahousehold allocation based
on a particular social institution for the organization of agricultural production
practiced among certain ethnic groups in West Africa. In the context of agri-
cultural production by a household unit, the ethnographic literature makes a
distinction between “common” farm plots, managed by the household head, to
which all household members tend to contribute some labor, and “private”
plots that are worked individually or by smaller groups within the household.
The head of the household carries a particular obligation to provide for the
entire household using the proceeds from the common plot.
We highlight how this institution, while resolving certain problems of com-
mitment and informational asymmetry, can also lead to a gendered pattern
in the allocation of productive resources and consumption within the house-
hold, one that is consistent with the existing empirical literature. Using a survey
of agricultural households in Burkina Faso, drawn from eight villages around
the country, we test the theoretical predictions of the model regarding pro-
duction and consumption within the household.
Consistent with the theory, we show, using rainfall variations to capture
exogenous weather shocks to agricultural output, that the head of the house-
hold has a higher propensity to spend on household public goods out of his
farm income than do the other household members. This suggests that mem-
bers of the household should be more willing to work on the plots farmed
by the household head than on private plots, because household heads are able,
thanks to a particular social institution, to commit to using the fruits of their
toil on household public goods. Consistent with this reasoning, we show that
common plots managed by the household head use family labor more in-
tensively and achieve higher yields than private plots ðafter controlling for plot
characteristics and the crops plantedÞ.
As in the previous literature ðUdry 1996; Goldstein and Udry 2008Þ, we
find that farm plots managed by male household members, on average, use
family labor more intensively and achieve higher yields than those managed
by female household members in the same household. However, no such
gender difference exists among the private plots: male and female private
plots have similar yields, and each is farmed primarily with family labor of
the same gender as the plot manager. Thus, the social institution that places
a particular obligation on the head of the household—and the fact that the
household head is usually a man—can account entirely for the gendered pat-
tern in agricultural production documented in the existing literature.This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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related to two papers in the recent literature. First, Akresh ð2008Þ finds, for
a nationally representative sample of agricultural households in Burkina Faso,
from a survey conducted in 1990, that households that experience negative
rainfall shocks do satisfy Udry’s test of Pareto efficiency in household pro-
duction. Akresh argues that the efficient allocation of productive resources may
require household members to engage in cooperative agreements—where, for
instance, one household member promises to provide labor on the plot of
another in exchange for some future compensation—and these may be costly
to negotiate, monitor, and enforce. Therefore, members of a household may
only find it worthwhile to negotiate such agreements when agricultural pro-
duction is particularly hard-hit, as it would be during a season of very low
rainfall.
In the case of the CEDRES/Laval survey used for the empirical analysis
in this article, rainfall levels in the four provinces from which our sample is
drawn were all above the 30-year average during 1994 ðbetween 0.3 and
2.0 standard deviationsÞ and no more than 0.4 standard deviations below the
average in 1993. Therefore, our finding of higher yields on plots managed by
the household head is consistent with the explanation provided by Akresh
ðalthough there is not sufficient variation in rainfall levels in our sample to
test this formallyÞ. Our findings, in conjunction with the explanation pro-
vided by Akresh, would suggest that household members provide labor on
farm plots managed by the household head, even when rainfall levels are fa-
vorable, because the “exchange” taking place in this instance does not require
specific negotiations, monitoring, or enforcement: the social norms ensure that
all parties concerned have the appropriate incentives.
Goldstein and Udry ð2008Þ also find, for a sample of agricultural house-
holds in Southern Ghana, that women achieve significantly lower yields on
their farm plots compared to men who belong to the same household, after
controlling for observable plot characteristics and the types of crops planted.
However, the entirety of the gender effect can be explained by the length of
time that the plot was left fallow before planting. Goldstein and Udry provide
evidence to show that fallowing improves soil fertility but that individuals
with little political power within the community risk losing rights to their
land if it is left fallow over extended periods.
It is conceivable that, in the context of the Burkinabe households consid-
ered in our analysis, the length of fallow also varies with status within the
household or community and that this can account for some part of the
variation in plot yields observed for our sample. In the absence of informationThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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542 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eregarding the practice of fallowing land in the CEDRES/Laval survey, it is
not possible to confirm or rule out the fallowing hypothesis. However, we
would argue that a compelling hypothesis should also account for the dra-
matic variations in labor intensity and the response of household consump-
tion to shocks to different types of household income that we observe in
the data. The norm-related hypothesis proposed in this article, as well as the
ethnographic accounts discussed in the next section, can account for these
patterns, but the fallowing hypothesis, on its own, does not.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the
ethnographic literature on the organization of agricultural production and the
consumption among a number of ethnic groups in West Africa, based, in
particular, around the Sahel region. Section III develops a simple model of
intrahousehold allocation that draws on this ethnographic evidence. A brief
description of the household survey used for the econometric analysis is given
in Section IV. Section V presents some descriptive statistics, focusing on the
differences between the household head’s plots and plots farmed by other
household members. Section VI discusses our empirical findings. Section VII
explores alternative hypotheses, and Section VIII concludes.
II. Household Production and Consumption in Burkina Faso
In this section, we highlight two features of production and consumption
within Burkinabe households by drawing on ethnographic studies. The first
of these features is that the household typically carries out its farming ac-
tivities on a number of distinct plots with well-defined boundaries, each un-
der the control of a specific adult household member. Among these plots,
there is a separation between common plots under the control of the head
of the household and private plots controlled by other household members.
The second feature is that according to existing social norms, the head of
the household is expected to provide for the entire household using the
proceeds of the common plot, but the other household members have more
leeway in how they use the income from their own plots.
These two features will play an important part in the formal model in-
troduced in the following section. Therefore, we discuss them in some detail
here in the context of the ethnographic literature. The studies cited below
are all based on the Mossi, an ethnic group that practices farming and that
constitutes about 40% of the population of Burkina Faso ðCIAWorld Fact-
book 2009Þ. The Mossi are also the predominant ethnic group in two of the
eight villages used for the CEDRES/Laval household survey that is used
for the empirical analysis in this article.This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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by ethnographers consistently distinguishes between common plots, which
are farmed communally and managed by the head of the household, and
private plots, which are managed by other members of the household. Ham-
mond ð1966Þ, with regard to the Mossi of the Yatenga region in the north
of Burkina Faso, writes:
In the extended family, the father has final authority over the allocation of all farmland
used by his wives and children. Certain fields are under the more specific proprie-
torship of each of his mature sons who may in turn delegate the right to use them to
their wives and their own sons. In each instance such fields are worked principally by
their respective proprietors who have the first right to their products. However, most
of the fields farmed by the head of the extended family are worked with the help of his
wife or his wives and children, by any younger brothers who might be attached to his
household, and, occasionally, by a sister’s son who has come to reside with his mother’s
brother. ð76Þ
This distinction between fields managed by the head of the household and
other family members is also evident in the characterization of the Mossi
provided by Fiske ð1991Þ:
The ½Mossi typically work their fields communally. A small group of people led by a
senior man jointly cultivates a collective field ðpuugoÞ. A cultivating group typically
consists of the senior man and his wives and children, often with his younger brothers
and their wives and children. . . . The people who spend the bulk of the day cul-
tivating the joint corporate field ðpuugoÞ of the extended family together also cul-
tivate separate fields ðbeolseÞ. . . . Such a separate field may be cultivated by a junior
man with his wives and children ðif anyÞ, or by a wife of the senior man together with
her children ðif anyÞ; sometimes older children have separate fields. . . . Sometimes
a separate field is cultivated alone by an adolescent, by a young man not yet married,
by a widower with no surviving children at home, by a young wife with no children
yet, or by a wife with no surviving children. But often the separate field, like the
corporate field, is cultivated collectively. ð260–61Þ
The descriptions above also suggest that the pattern of family labor con-
tribution to a plot may vary considerably between common and private plots.
All household members are expected to contribute labor to the common plot.
But private plots are farmed individually or with the assistance of a nuclear
group within the extended family. However, there are also indications in the
literature that rules of labor allocation are not strict. Fiske ð1991Þ writes: “In
these cultivating groups ½farming the common plot, what really matters is
participation, even token participation—if a member is making an effort, peo-
ple do not assess the amount. Complete failure to participate in the collectiveThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
544 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Efarming, however, produces tension and results in critical gossip, although the
group in fact continues to feed a member who does not work” ð260Þ.
Along similar lines, Lallemand ð1977Þ, in a detailed study of two extended
families in the Yatenga region, observes that “although the holders of the
‘private’ plots are meant to provide labor to the ‘common’ plot between eight
in the morning and five in the evening, these time restrictions may be relaxed
and flexible according to the vigilance or indulgence of the head worker”
ð46Þ.1
Since the rules regarding the allocation of one’s labor across different farm
plots cultivated by one’s family are fluid and are not necessarily strictly en-
forced, a reasonable approach to adopt in the formal theory would be to model
these allocations as voluntary contributions by the individuals concerned.
However, this raises the question of why household members would make
any contributions to the common plot at all beyond a nominal amount. One
possible answer would be that such voluntary contributions are motivated by
altruism. But the ethnographic literature points more strongly to an alterna-
tive explanation: the proceeds of the common plot are intended for the com-
mon good of the entire household. Hammond ð1966Þ writes:
The produce from these fields ðcommon plotsÞ is stored in the granaries of the family
head. There it is drawn upon principally to meet the individual needs of his house-
hold: to feed his wives and dependent children, to pay his tax, to be used as part of the
bridewealth payment made by his sons when they marry, to offer hospitality to visi-
tors, and to provide for the preparation of the millet gruel and millet bear used in
sacrificial libations. But the millet in the granaries of the family head serves also as
an emergency store to be used by any member of the family in need. ð76Þ
Lallemand ð1977, 100Þ provides a similar description of the use of the
harvest from the common plot. It is likely that the head of the household is
motivated, at least in part, by altruism in his decisions regarding the use of
the proceeds from the common plot. However, we argue that a binding social
rule is necessary to account for the pattern of usage described in the ethno-
graphic literature, which is also borne out in our empirical analysis: since the
extent of head’s altruism, and the nature of this altruism, is likely to vary across
households, altruism alone would lead to considerable heterogeneity across
households in the usage of the proceeds from the‘common plot. A more regu-
lar pattern is more consistent with a social rule that is generally observed across
households.1 Authors’ translation of the following original text: “On sait que les détenteurs de ces champs
personnels sont tenus de ne pas soustraire leurs efforts aux champs collectifs après huit heures du
matin et avant cinq heures du soir; cependant, ces limites horaires sont plus souples et plus floues et
dépendent surtout de la vigilance ou de l’indulgence du chef des travaux.”
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Kazianga and Wahhaj 545III. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy
Imagine a household consisting of n adult members indexed by i 5 1; 2; : : : ;
n:2 There are m0 possible consumption goods, of which m1 are private goods
and m2 are household public goods ðm0 5 m1 1 m2Þ. Let the vector xi 5
x1; x2; : : : ; xm1ð Þ denote private goods expenditures of household member i,
and let z 5 ðz1; z2; : : : ; zm2Þ denote a vector of public goods. Person i’s level
of utility is given by ui xi; zð Þ.
Each household member owns a plot of land with a vector of character-
istics Ai, which includes land area, soil quality, and so forth. There are mk
different crops that may be grown on a farm, indexed k 5 1; 2; : : : ; mk.
These crops may overlap with the private and public consumption goods.
Each household member has access to the same production technology, de-
scribed by
yk 5 FkðLm; Lf ; AiÞ: ð1Þ
Here, yk is the output level of crop k on person i ’s farm plot, assuming that
crop k has been planted on this farm ðfor simplicity, we assume that a single
crop can be planted on a farm at any one timeÞ. Inputs Lm and Lf are, re-
spectively, the levels of male and female labor used on person i’s farm plot.
Household member i has a labor endowment of Li hours. Each person has
the same labor productivity, except that male and female labor may vary in
their relative productivity in different tasks. This last assumption is implicit
in the description of agricultural production in ð1Þ. We assume that there is
no labor market present, such that all farm work must be done using family
labor ðalthough this is a simplification, the data will show that there is only
very limited use of hired labor in agriculture for our sample of householdsÞ.
A. The Collective Model of the Household
First, we provide a characterization of the efficient allocation of resources

















pkiFkiðLim; Lif ; AiÞ; ð3Þ2 Hereafter, whenever we refer to a “household member,” this will mean an adult member.
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where px; pz , and pk represent, respectively, a vector of prices of the private and
household public goods, and the market price of crop k; I s is the set of all
householdmembers belonging to gender s:I s 5 fi ∈ I : i belongs to gender sg;
ki is the choice of crop on the farm plot of household member i; and l
i is the
Pareto weight assigned to individual i in the household welfare maximization
problem.
It is well known that this problem satisfies the standard separation prop-
erty of the agricultural household model ðsee, e.g., Bardhan and Udry 1999,
chap. 1Þ. In particular, Udry ð1996Þ shows that if Fk ð Þ is increasing and con-
cave in both types of labor, then the output levels are equal on plots that have the
same characteristics and are planted with the same crop, that is, FkiðLim; Lif ; AiÞ
5 FkjðLjm; Ljf ; A jÞ if ki 5 kj and Ai 5 A j . Then, adjusting the notation to allow
for multiple households and time periods, the following specification enables
us to test for efficiency in household production:
Qhtci 5 Xhcib1 Ghig1 lhtc 1 εhtci; ð6Þ
where Qhtci is the log of yield on plot i in year t , planted to crop c and belong-
ing to household h; Xci is a vector of physical characteristics of plot i; lhtc is a
household-year-crop fixed effect; and Ghi is a vector of individual characteris-
tics of individual i in household h. Udry ð1996Þ shows that if productive re-
sources are allocated efficiently within the household, then g5 0; that is, yield
on a plot should not depend on the characteristics of the individual who con-
trols it. Our data will enable us to replicate Udry’s test of productive efficiency
within the household for our household sample.







f ; that is, if two farm plots with the same characteristics
are planted to the same crop, then they should make use of the same amount
of male labor and the same amount of female labor. Therefore, correspond-
ing to ð6Þ, we can derive a specification for the level of each type of labor used
on a particular plot:
l jhtci 5 Xhcib̂
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Kazianga and Wahhaj 547where l jhtci is the amount of labor of type j applied to plot i per unit area, in
year t, and plot i is planted to crop c and belongs to house h. Variable l̂jhtc is
a household-year-crop fixed effect. Productive efficiency within the house-
hold implies that ĝ j 5 0 for j 5 m; f .
B. A Model of Voluntary Contributions under a Social Norm
Next, we consider a noncooperative equilibrium for the model. We assume
that each household member is able to allocate the proceeds of his farm plot
and his labor endowment freely and that, because of lack of commitment,
the members of the household cannot have a cooperative agreement that
would enable them to implement the Pareto efficient outcome in house-
hold production. However, traditional institutions require that the proceeds
of a common plot managed by the head of the household be spent entirely
on certain household public goods, failing which the household head will be
subject to social sanctions by the wider community.
For ease of exposition, we assume there are just three household members:
the head of the household ðrepresented by the letters hÞ, who has a zero en-
dowment of labor and manages only the common plot, and one adult male
and another adult female member ðrepresented by the letters m and f Þ, who
have labor endowments Em and Ef , respectively, and manage their own private
plots. There is a single crop, with market price of 1; a single private good x,
with market price px ; and one household public good z, with market price pz .
We assume that there is no scope for saving. The social norm requires the
household head to spend the proceeds from the common plot on the public
good z.
Labor allocation and consumption decisions are made in two stages. In the
first stage, household members m and f decide how to allocate their labor
endowments across the three plots. Following these decisions, farm incomes
are realized. Income from person i ’s plot is given by yi 5 F ðLim; Lif ; AiÞ.
In the second stage, m and f choose how to allocate their incomes across
the different consumption goods. The household head h is constrained to
spend all the income from the common plot on good z. Hence, we have
zh 5 ð1=pzÞF ðLhm; Lhf ; AhÞ; where zh denotes the level of expenditures by the
household head on the public good.
We assume that the household decisions constitute a subgame perfect equi-
librium. Therefore, the equilibrium choices can be determined using backward
induction. Given income y 5 ym; y f; y cð Þ ðrepresenting incomes from the
male, female, and common plots, respectivelyÞ, the expenditure levels denoted
by xi; zið Þ, i 5 m; f ; solve the following problems:This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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xm; zm
umðxm; zm 1 z f 1 z hÞ
subject to pxxm 1 pzzm ≤ ym;
ð8Þ
z f ; z fð Þ5 arg max
x f ; z f
u f ðx f; zm 1 z f 1 z hÞ
subject to pxx
f 1 pzz
f ≤ y f:
ð9Þ
The interesting case occurs when both m and f make zero contribution to the
public good z. In this case, we obtain xm yð Þ5 ym=px; x f yð Þ5 y f=px; and to-
tal expenditures on the public good, z yð Þ5 yc=pz .
Given the functions xm yð Þ; xf yð Þ; and z yð Þ, we can derive the equilib-







represent the allocation of labor by household member i across
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where y 5 ðym; y f; ycÞ, yi 5 F Lim; Lif
 
for i 5 m; f ; c.
Since all the proceeds from the private plots are used for private consump-
tion, we obtain Lmf 5 L
f
m 5 0; that is, the household members do not con-
tribute any labor to each other’s private plots because doing so does not yield
any benefits for themselves. Therefore, both m and f allocate all of his or
her labor endowment between the common plot and his or her own private
plot.
Thus, all household members are persuaded to provide some labor on the
farm managed by the head of the household; given the social norm that pro-
ceeds from the common plot are to be used for household public goods only,
both m and f can expect to reap some rewards from toiling on the common
plot. However, they do not contribute any labor on each other’s private farms
because the managers of the private plots cannot commit to spend their in-This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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result that the common plot is farmed with a mix of male and female labor,
while the private plots are farmed almost entirely with labor of the same type as
the gender of the plot manager.3
C. Predictions
These predictions can be tested by estimating ð7Þ. Let Hhi be a dummy var-
iable that takes a value of one if individual i in household h is the household
head, and zero otherwise; and let Mhi be a dummy variable that takes a value of
one if individual i in household h is an adult male but not the household head,
and zero otherwise. If Ghi 5 Hhi; Mhið Þ, and correspondingly, ĝ j 5 ĝ jH ; ĝ jM
 
,
then, under the noncooperative equilibrium analyzed above, we have ĝmM > 0,
ĝ
f
M < 0, and ĝ
m
H
> 0, ĝ fH > ĝ
f
M . In words, these conditions imply that ðiÞ male
plots use male labor more intensively than female plots with similar char-
acteristics and planted to the same crops; ðiiÞ female plots use female labor more
intensively than male plots with similar characteristics and planted to the same
crops; ðiiiÞ the common plot uses male labor more intensively than female plots
and female labor more intensively than male plots, after controlling for the type
of crop and the plot characteristics.
Note that the model also predicts that junior household members do not
provide any labor on each other’s private plots, but we acknowledge that these
conditions may not hold in reality because of elements not captured in the
model. For example, the junior household members may provide some labor
on the private plots of family members as a result of side transactions. We
discuss these possibilities after presenting the econometric results.
Furthermore, the model predicts that yields across different plots belong-
ing to the same household can depend on the characteristics of the plot owner
ðafter controlling for plot characteristics and the type of crop plantedÞ. In
particular, if the junior household members value the household public good
sufficiently, then the common plot will be farmed more intensively than ei-
ther the male or the female plots. Therefore, we would expect yields to be
higher on the common plots compared to the individual plots. In ð6Þ, if Ghi 5
Hhi; Mhið Þ, and correspondingly, g5 gH ; gMð Þ, then we have the prediction
that gH > 0 and gH > gM . There is no clear prediction about the sign of gM .
If both m and f make voluntary contributions to the household public
good, then equilibrium expenditures on consumption goods will be deter-
mined by total household income only, and these will be independent of the3 Fafchamps ð2001Þ discusses how land and labor transactions within the households are used to
overcome the commitment problem.
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550 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eincome shares of the different household members ðsee Lundberg and Pollak
1993Þ. In this situation, household members will allocate their labor across
different plots so as to maximize total household income. Therefore, labor al-
location within the household will be efficient, and the empirical predictions
will correspond to those for the efficient model.
D. Consumption
The collective model of the household and the model of voluntary labor
contributions introduced in Section III.B also provide testable predictions
involving household consumption. First, in the case of the collective model,
temporary shocks to household income should have no impact on expendi-
tures on any particular good after total household expenditures have been
controlled for. Otherwise, it would be possible to achieve better consumption
smoothing by reallocating expenditures on that good across time periods.
Duflo and Udry ð2003Þ use this insight to devise a test for efficiency in
household consumption using rainfall data to capture weather-related shocks.
We replicate their test in this article using data on household public goods and
income from the common and private plots. We briefly discuss here Duflo and
Udry’s test of efficiency in consumption.
We assume the following log-linear relationship between rainfall and house-
hold farm income:
log yhitð Þ5 R0vt l1i 1 ðP 0ht l2iÞRvt 1 diT94 1 Xh 1 yhit ; ð12Þ
where yhit represents period t income from plots belonging to household h
managed by household members of type i ðwhere i stands for either the house-
hold head, female household members, or junior male membersÞ; Rvt is a vector
of measures of the level of rainfall in province v ðwhere household h is locatedÞ
in period t ; Pht is a vector describing the characteristics of plots, such as soil type
and topography, farmed by household h in period t ; T94 is a dummy that takes
a value of one in the year 1994, and zero otherwise; Xh denotes household
fixed effects to capture time-invariant household characteristics; and yhit is the
error term that captures other exogenous shocks that affect farm income for
household h from plots managed by household members of type i in period t.4
The estimated coefficients are then used to compute a linear combination






Rvt . These fitted4 We do not include household plot characteristics, Pht , on their own in the specification, as the
change in these characteristics from one year to the next is only slight, and therefore the effects are
essentially subsumed in the household fixed effects.
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by rainfall variations. If we assume that demand for each commodity can be
expressed as a log-linear function of total expenditures, household Pareto
weights, and other household and regional characteristics, then we can derive
the following specifications relating household expenditures and income:
log ehtð Þ5 o
i5m; f; c
pi ŷhit 1 dT94 1 Xh 1 uht ; ð13Þ
log xhtð Þ5 o
i5m; f; c
pxi ŷhit 1 dxT94 1 Xh 1 uxh; ð14Þ
where eht represents total expenditures in household h in period t and xht rep-
resents expenditures on some specific consumption good in household h in
period t. The error terms uh and uxh capture other exogenous factors that may
influence household expenditures. Under the collective model of the household,






for each i; j ∈ I : ð15Þ
Following Duflo and Udry ð2003Þ, we test for ð15Þ using a nonlinearWald test.
Equation ð14Þ also provides a test for the model of voluntary contributions
under the social norm. Specifically, the model predicts that, if x is a house-
hold public good, then pxm 5 pxf 5 0 and pxc 5 1; that is, public goods ex-
penditures are responsive to exogenous shocks to income from the common
plot ðand, in particular, a one-on-one effect if the social norms require that all
income from common plots be spent on household public goodsÞ, but they
are not responsive to income shocks on private plots farmed by the house-
hold.
It should be noted that the estimates from ð13Þ and ð14Þ will be biased and
the overidentification test in ð15Þ will be invalid if our measure of rainfall does
not satisfy the exclusion restriction. In particular, changes in prices of con-
sumer goods may be correlated with rainfall, and rainfall may affect prefer-
ences between different household goods, including leisure. In these instances,
the estimates of the coefficients pi and pxi would include a part of the direct
effect of rainfall changes on household expenditures and demand for good x.
We consider the validity of the identifying assumptions in more detail in
Section VII.D after presenting our results.This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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The household survey was conducted by the University of Laval, Quebec,
and the University of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso. It was carried out in
four provinces in different parts of Burkina Faso: the Namentenga province in
the Central Plateau, the Soum province in the North, the Kossi province
in the West, and the Nahouri province in the Southeast. In each province,
two villages were chosen, one to represent the wealthier villages and the
other to represent the poorer ones in that region. A sample of 35 households
was randomly selected in each village except in the North, where 40 house-
holds were chosen in anticipation of a higher dropout rate due to out-
migration. Agriculture is the primary source of livelihood in all the villages,
but livestock is relatively more important in the North, the region where pop-
ulation pressures and soil degradation have been most acute.
The survey was conducted during the 1993 and 1994 agricultural seasons
and covered farm characteristics, production technologies, agricultural inputs
and outputs, market activities, and household expenditures and consump-
tion. Information relating to each farm plot was obtained from the individual
in the household who had responsibility for it during that season, while infor-
mation regarding the common plots was obtained from the head of the house-
hold. Information about expenditures, sales, livestock holding, and transfers
was also gathered at the individual level, while information about housing
and farming equipment was gathered at the household level, with the head of
the household usually providing most of the information.
The household survey did not distinguish between the household head’s
private plots and common plots that he or she managed on behalf of the
household. Therefore, for the purpose of the analysis in this article, we consider
all plots farmed by the household head as common plots.
The questionnaire on household expenditures recorded information on the
identity of the household member who made each purchase and, for the year
1994, also the identity of the person for whom the expense was incurred. We
use the latter information to identify expenditures on household public goods.
Specifically, we classify a particular good, say x, as a household public good if
at least 75% of all reports of expenditures on x in the 1994 survey mentioned
“all members of the household” or “other household members” as the in-
tended beneficiary.5 This classification is then applied to all households in
both survey years. The list of household public goods and private goods ac-
cording to this classification is shown in the appendix in table A1.5 This relatively high cut-off level was chosen since our goal is to identify a subset of expenditure
items that we are confident are household public goods, not necessarily to capture all household
public goods.
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some amount of processing and preparation, typically done within the house-
hold, such as sorghum and millet flour/grain, raw meat, and fresh vegetables;
as well as items used in food preparation, such as cooking oil, salt, spices and
other condiments, and kitchen utensils. By contrast, the private goods in-
clude food items that may be consumed without any additional preparation,
for example, doughnuts, cooked meals, local beer and other alcoholic bever-
ages, tea, and coffee. Furthermore, private goods include durable goods, such
as a radio, a bicycle, and a motorbike. All these items are, arguably, easier to
exclude from other household members than unprocessed food items that
must pass through the household kitchen. It should be evident from table A1
that adjusting the 75% rule leads to slightly different classifications, but this
does not affect our qualitative results on household public goods and income
shocks that will be reported in Section VI.D.6
V. Household Headship and Junior Household Members
As the theoretical framework used in this article makes the distinction, in the
context of agricultural production, between gender and household headship,
we explore in the data how closely these two variables are correlated. Only 22
of the random sample of 290 households interviewed for the CEDRES/Laval
survey in 1993 were headed by women. Therefore, it is evident that household
headship is predominantly a male phenomenon.
The female heads are invariably widows, often the sole adult in a house-
hold with young children or grandchildren, and in some instances living with
unmarried sons or daughters. The distinctive structure of female-headed house-
holds raises the question whether the social norms described in Section II on
the allocation of productive resources within the household should apply to
them. Given the small number of households with female heads in our sam-
ple, we are not able to answer this question satisfactorily using the available
data. For the main analysis, we do not distinguish between male-headed and
female-headed households. Nevertheless, we return to this question after the
main results have been presented.
To be able to test the model of voluntary labor contributions presented
in Section III.B, we need to be able to compare farm plots managed by a
male household head with those managed by other—both male and female—
household members. Table 1 shows, for all plots farmed by the households
in the CEDRES/Laval sample during the years 1993 and 1994, the rela-6 Results based on alternative rules are not reported in this article but are available from us on
request.
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TABLE 1
RELATIONSHIP OF PLOT MANAGER TO HOUSEHOLD HEAD








Spouse of sibling .0 .9
Nephew/niece .1 .2
Father/mother .1 .5
Other relation .1 .3
554 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Etionship of the plot manager to the household head. About 69% of these
plots were farmed by the household head himself ðor herself Þ. For the pur-
pose of our empirical analysis, these plot observations will be classified as
“common” plots. In the remainder of the cases, the plot is managed ðin order
of decreasing frequencyÞ by a spouse of the head, a son or daughter, a brother,
a daughter-in-law, or a sister-in-law. These observations will serve as the
“private” plots in this study. The managers of the private plots are henceforth
referred to as “junior male” and “junior female” household members.
Table 2 shows that the common plots, as defined here, are, on average,
about twice as large as the private plots farmed by the junior men and three
times as large as the private plots farmed by the junior women. However, the
common plots have the lowest average yields: about 15% lower than on ju-
nior female plots and barely half of that on junior male plots.
Table 2 also indicates the use of very different types of labor on the farm
plots depending on the identity of the plot owner. The junior female plots are
farmed primarily with female family labor, which very likely includes hours
that the plot owner has herself spent working on the plot. The junior male
plots use both male and female family labor, but the contribution of male
labor is more significant ðabout twice as largeÞ than that of female family
labor. The common plots use substantial amounts of both male and female
family labor. All three types of plots use some amount of child family labor.
The descriptive statistics show that the nature of production on common
plots is, on average, very different from that on private plots, at least in terms
of the scale of farming and the types of labor used. This differentiated pattern
does not, in itself, imply that the allocation of labor across the household
plots is inefficient. The pattern may be explained by the different labor require-
ments of crops grown by different household members, by differences in soilThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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heads 77,042 1.18 11.71 44.27 29.96 1,420
ð305,190Þ ð1.26Þ ð20.9Þ ð53.8Þ ð45.3Þ
Female
heads 177,185 .58 6.19 21.17 46.29 67
ð691,669Þ ð.40Þ ð17.8Þ ð37.6Þ ð48.2Þ
All house-
hold heads 81,579 1.15 11.43 43.05 30.81 1,487
ð332,740Þ ð1.24Þ ð20.7Þ ð53.3Þ ð45.6Þ
Junior
men 150,545 .60 8.98 38.97 21.96 160
ð589,342Þ ð.57Þ ð20.1Þ ð51.0Þ ð42.4Þ
Junior
women 95,392 .45 7.35 9.17 40.9 333
ð433,985Þ ð.52Þ ð16.6Þ ð16.2Þ ð60.9Þ
Note. The table excludes, for each variable, the top percentile of observations. Due to missing values,
labor averages are based on a total of 1,600 observations. The CFA franc ðFCFAÞ refers to the currency of
the monetary union Communauté Financière Africaine, which includes Burkina Faso. At the time of the
survey, the approximate exchange rate was US$1 = FCFA 800. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Kazianga and Wahhaj 555type, and so forth. Therefore, we estimate equations ð6Þ and ð7Þ, which will en-




Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients for equation ð6Þ with dummy variables
for household headship and junior male status within the household ðthe default
category being junior female statusÞ. The estimated coefficient for the household
head dummy is large and significantly different from zero. Therefore, we are
able to reject the hypothesis of Pareto efficiency in household production. The
coefficient for the junior male dummy variable ðwhich takes a value of one if
the plot owner is an adult male who does not head the household and zero
otherwiseÞ is small and not statistically different from zero. Therefore, for plots
owned by the same household that have similar characteristics and are planted
to the same crops in the same year, there are no significant differences in yields
between those controlled by junior women and those controlled by junior men.
However, the estimated coefficients are consistent with the model of vol-
untary contributions. Recall, from Section III.C that the model predicts that
yields on common plots will be higher than those on private plots. The
estimated coefficient for the household head dummy is greater than zero andThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM




LnðPlot Yield in FCFAÞ
Coefficient SE
Junior male dummy .0127 .123
Male household head dummy .7747 .105
Plot size ð1st decile omittedÞ:
2nd decile 2.6671 .149
3rd decile 2.4843 .156
4th decile 2.9434 .162
5th decile 21.208 .162
6th decile 21.447 .175
7th decile 21.254 .171
8th decile 21.616 .181
9th decile 21.854 .182
10th decile 22.037 .178
Toposequence ðmid-slope omittedÞ:
Near bottom 2.492 .268
Plain 2.461 .250





Outside village .0225 .104
Note. Observations 5 1,967. Household-crop-year fixed effects are in-
cluded in each regression. The CFA franc ðFCFAÞ refers to the currency of
the monetary union Communauté Financière Africaine, which includes
Burkina Faso. At the time of the survey, the approximate exchange rate
was US$15FCFA 800.
556 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Egreater than the coefficient for the junior men, and the difference is statisti-
cally significant in both cases.
Note that these results are consistent with findings in the existing litera-
ture, which have shown, in similar contexts, that plot yields are higher for
men than for women when comparing across farms owned by the same house-
hold that are planted to the same crops and with similar characteristics ðsee,
e.g., Udry 1996; Goldstein and Udry 2008Þ. However, our findings show
that, for our sample of households, the higher yields achieved by men can be
attributed entirely to household headship, since there is no statistically signifi-
cant difference in plot yields between plots farmed by men and women who
do not head the household in which they live.
The large, positive coefficient for the household head dummy obtained in
the yield regression contrasts with the fact that common plots have lower
yields on average than private plots, as shown in table 1. This is primarily due
to the fact that yields decline with plot size ðwhich is evident from the plot
size coefficients in table 3Þ and that common plots are, on average, largerThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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a given plot size, yields are higher on common plots than on private plots.
B. Dispersion of Yields
Following a procedure adopted by Udry ð1996Þ, we compare the dispersion of
plot yields within the village, the household, and across plots farmed by the
same individual. Our primary aim in conducting this exercise is to explore
how effective the household head is in allocating productive resources effi-
ciently compared to junior household members and the household as a
whole. The ethnographic literature discussed in Section II and the evidence
in the preceding subsection suggests that the household head has better com-
mand over productive resources and, in particular, family labor, than do junior
household members. If this is so, the head has better means to achieve effi-
cient allocation of resources across his plots than would the village, the house-
hold as the whole, or junior household members.
We drop the term Ghi from ð6Þ and reestimate the equation after replacing
lhtc with village-crop-year fixed effects. Figure 1 shows the kernel estimate of
the density of the error term, which represents the deviation of yields, for
each plot in our sample, from the mean yield of the corresponding village-
crop-year group. The figure gives an indication of the variation in output
within each village across apparently identical plots, due to risk as well as the
misallocation of resources within the village. The same figure shows the de-Figure 1. Kernal estimates of density of yield function error terms
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year-group and from the mean yield of the corresponding individual-crop-
year-group. The dispersion around the household mean is noticeably smaller
than the dispersion around the village mean. It is evident from the figure that,
as with the ICRISAT data set used in Udry’s ð1996Þ study, the household
serves to allocate productive resources more efficiently across farm plots. The
deviations around the individual mean are virtually indistinguishable from
the deviations around the household mean. Thus, the contrast between the
individual and the household as vehicles for the efficient allocation of pro-
ductive resources is much smaller than the contrast between the household
and the village.7
To compare the effectiveness of the household head in allocating produc-
tive resources efficiently, with the individual and the household, we restrict
the sample to plots managed by the household head and recompute the
deviation of yields from the individual-crop-year group. If the household
head were similar to other members of the household in his or her ability
to distribute productive resources efficiently, then this last density function
would mirror those for the individual. Visually, we find that the dispersion
for the household head is noticeably smaller.8 Thus, the figure provides sug-
gestive evidence that the head has better control over the allocation of pro-
ductive resources across his or her farm plots than does the junior household
member, and, in particular, that he or she is better able to call upon family
members to work on his farm plots. Next, we trace the difference in plot
yields noted in Section VI.A to variations in labor use across plots.
C. Labor Allocation
Table 4, column 1, shows the estimated coefficients for equation ð7Þ. The re-
sults show that plots controlled by the household head use all types of family
labor—adult male, adult female, and child—more intensively than other plots
owned by the same household, after controlling for plot characteristics, the
crop planted, and the year of planting ðwith the difference being statistically
significant in each caseÞ. This pattern is inconsistent with the predictions of the7 Using the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distributions, we can reject
the null hypothesis that the village-level and household-level distributions are identical ðp-value5 .00Þ,
but we cannot reject the hypothesis that the household-level and individual-level distributions are identi-
cal ðp-value 5 .873Þ.
8 However, it should be noted that, using a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality
of distributions, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the individual-level distribution for ju-
nior household members and the corresponding distribution for the household head are identical
ðp-value 5 .664Þ.
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Junior male dummy 1.211 21.163 .2114
ð.137Þ ð.126Þ ð.131Þ
Male household head dummy 2.162 .5196 .8146
ð.114Þ ð.104Þ ð.108Þ
Plot size ð1st decile omittedÞ:
2nd decile 2.6086 2.5258 2.7544
ð.178Þ ð.164Þ ð.170Þ
3rd decile 2.9657 2.8277 2.7673
ð.188Þ ð.173Þ ð.180Þ
4th decile 21.312 21.389 2.8364
ð.195Þ ð.179Þ ð.186Þ
5th decile 21.474 21.317 21.046
ð.188Þ ð.173Þ ð.179Þ
6th decile 21.723 21.71 21.133
ð.198Þ ð.182Þ ð.189Þ
7th decile 21.757 21.814 21.083
2.201 ð.185Þ ð.192Þ
8th decile 21.643 21.881 21.012
ð.203Þ ð.187Þ ð.194Þ
9th decile 21.872 22.267 21.035
ð.210Þ ð.193Þ ð.201Þ
10th decile 22.204 22.577 21.21
ð.217Þ ð.199Þ ð.207Þ
Toposequence ðnear bottom omittedÞ:
Mid-slope .3143 .3994 .2027
ð.304Þ ð.279Þ ð.290Þ
Plain 2.1746 2.0093 2.3498
ð.192Þ ð.177Þ ð.184Þ
Soil type ðclay omittedÞ:
Sand 2.2028 2.0766 .2597
ð.152Þ ð.140Þ ð.146Þ
Laterite .0724 2.1066 .4236
ð.177Þ ð.163Þ ð.169Þ
Gravel .3381 .0471 .8797
ð.308Þ ð.284Þ ð.295Þ
Location ðvillage excludedÞ:
Outside village .2246 2.0013 2.0065
ð.112Þ ð.103Þ ð.107Þ
Note. Dependent variable 5 lnðlabor days per unit area on plot of landÞ. Observations 5 1,979. Household-
crop-year fixed effects are included in each regression. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Kazianga and Wahhaj 559Pareto efficient ðcollectiveÞ model. As discussed in Section III.A, the model
predicts that the allocation of labor across plots can depend on the plot
characteristics and the crop planted but that it should be independent of the
characteristics of the plot owner.
While plots farmed by junior men use male family labor more intensively
than those farmed by junior women, the opposite is true for female family
labor, by about the same order of magnitude. There are no significant dif-This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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560 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eferences in the use of child labor between the junior men and junior women.
The pattern of labor allocation across agricultural plots appears consistent
with the variation in plot yields discussed earlier, with the common plots
achieving the highest yields and also making use of family labor and outside
labor most intensively.
This pattern is also, at least in part, consistent with the predictions of the
model of voluntary labor contributions discussed in Section III.D. Recall that
one of the model’s predictions is that the common plot uses male family la-
bor more intensively than private plots farmed by women and female family
labor more intensively than private plots farmed by junior men. If we inter-
pret the plots farmed by the household head as common plots, then the es-
timated coefficients correspond to these predictions.
However, the model of voluntary labor contributions also generated the
prediction that household members do not provide any labor on each others’
private plots, and the descriptive statistics in table 1 show that they clearly
do ðsince family labor of the opposite gender is used on private plotsÞ. We
speculate that such labor contributions, which are much smaller than con-
tributions to the common plots, may be due to side transactions between
the junior male members and the women within the same household, a
dynamic flow of goods and services in which labor is just one element. Ham-
mond ð1966Þ describes some exchanges along these lines: a junior male, with a
bicycle, may help out a female household member to carry some of her pro-
duce to a distant market and, in exchange, she may spend some time working
on his plot during the farming season. Our theoretical model did not allow
for such exchanges.9
The pattern of labor allocation indicates that the household head is able
to induce family members to provide labor on common plots much more
effectively than the junior men and women. It also shows that while these
junior household members have the assistance of some family labor of the
opposite gender on their private plots, they are relying primarily on labor of
their own gender. This labor of their own gender is potentially their own9 An alternative hypothesis is suggested by the ethnographic studies on the Mossi discussed in Sec. II.
A junior household member, if married, usually cultivates the private plots assigned to him with the
assistance of his own nuclear family, living under the same household head ðHammond 1966; Fiske
1991Þ and may have similar rights and obligations in relation to them as the household head does in
relation to all household members. This would imply positive levels of female family labor on junior
male plots but no corresponding use of male family labor on female plots. However, the latter
prediction does not fit the data well: table 4 shows similar intensities in the use of male family labor
on female plots and the use of female family labor on male plots ðafter controlling for plot char-
acteristics and the crop being grownÞ, and therefore this hypothesis, on its own, does not explain the
labor patterns in the data adequately.
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data.
Why is the head of the household so much more successful at command-
ing family labor? The model presented in Section III.B posits that it is
because the household head is committed to spending the proceeds from the
common plot on household public goods. We analyze consumption data
next to see if this hypothesis has any support in the data.
D. Expenditures on Household Public Goods and Rainfall Shocks
Using data on seasonal rainfall for each province in Burkina Faso, we esti-
mate equation ð12Þ for three different sources of household income: junior
female, junior male, and household head farm income. The specification in-
cludes monthly rainfall during the months June, July, August, and September
in the current year and annual rainfall during the previous year, interacted
with plot characteristics. The monthly measures for rainfall in the current year
were chosen as the June to September period corresponds with the planting
season when adequate rainfall is critical. The level of rainfall during the pre-
vious year can affect the moisture content in the soil ðsee, e.g., Xie et al.
2002Þ, which can be an important determinant of soil fertility ðMarten and
Vityakon 1986Þ, but the timing of the rainfall is, arguably, unimportant in
this regard. For a given level of rainfall, the amount of moisture can also de-
pend on topography and type of soil in the farm plot; hence, we interact pre-
vious year’s total rainfall with plot characteristics. However, the optimal timing
for rainfall during the planting reason does not depend on plot character-
istics per se but on the crops being planted; therefore, we do not interact
current year’s rainfall with plot characteristics or with the crop choices, as
these are endogenous variables.
The coefficients from the first-stage regressions are shown in table 5. The
F-tests indicate that the coefficients for the rainfall variables and the plot char-
acteristics and rainfall interactions are jointly significant in all three regressions.
In the presence of multiple endogenous regressors, however, the first-stage
F-test is not sufficient to assessweak identification. For such cases, Stock,Wright,
and Yogo ð2002Þ and Stock and Yogo ð2005Þ recommend the Cragg-Donald
weak instrument test statistic ðCragg and Donald 1993Þ as an alternative to
the traditional F-test. We will return to the Cragg-Donald test when we dis-
cuss the second-stage results.
Using the fitted values for the different types of farm income and expendi-
tures, we estimate equation ð13Þ and also ð14Þ for household public goods.
The coefficients from the second-stage regression provide a measure of the re-
sponsiveness of household expenditures to changes in household income due toThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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TABLE 5
HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES AND INCOME: FIRST-STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS
Household Head Junior Male Female
Current-year rainfall, amount below
historical average in:
June 2.07745*** 2.00132 .05651***
ð.01928Þ ð.01833Þ ð.02106Þ
July 2.62151*** 2.24146*** 2.47169***
ð.09562Þ ð.09090Þ ð.10448Þ
August .16894 .00503 2.17768***
ð.04257Þ*** ð.04047Þ ð.04652Þ
September 2.76340 2.32114*** 2.41689***
ð.12168Þ ð.11567Þ ð.13296Þ
Previous year’s rainfall interacted with
household plot characteristics:
Junior male plots:
Plain .00010** 2.00004 2.00003
ð.00004Þ ð.00004Þ ð.00005Þ
Laterite .00007 .00018* .00000
ð.00011Þ ð.00010Þ ð.00012Þ
Junior female plots:
Plain 2.00110*** .00260*** .00055
ð.00040Þ ð.00038Þ ð.00044Þ
Laterite 2.00340** .00658*** 2.00082
ð.00132Þ ð.00125Þ ð.00144Þ
Household head plots:
Plain 2.00162** .00032 .00700***
ð.00067Þ ð.00063Þ ð.00073Þ
Laterite .00149 2.00129 2.00261**
ð.00105Þ ð.00100Þ ð.00115Þ
1994 year dummy 91.383*** 45.042*** 92.803***
ð15.19390Þ ð14.44245Þ ð16.60152Þ
Constant 146.947*** 58.022*** 137.588***
ð23.14951Þ ð22.00459Þ ð25.29416Þ
Test for all coefficients being jointly
significant F-statistics ðp -valuesÞ 5.747 14.90 18.10
Note. Dependent variable 5 lnðincome from plots managed by XÞ. Observations 5 550. Standard errors
are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
562 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eexogenous rainfall shocks. The second-stage estimation results, with clustered
standard errors for each household across the two time periods, are shown in
table 6. We report estimates of two-stage least squares ð2SLSÞ for household
public goods in column 3. The coefficients indicate that a 10% increase in
the household head’s income due to variations in rainfall leads to a 4.03%
increase in expenditures on household public goods. This effect is statistically
significant at the 1% level. By contrast, the corresponding values for income
from junior male private plots is 2.20% ðsignificant at the 1% levelÞ, and for
income from junior female private plots it is statistically insignificant. UsingThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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TABLE 6















Lnðhousehold head incomeÞ .421*** .463*** .549*** .629***
ð.137Þ ð.148Þ ð.071Þ ð.077Þ
Lnð junior male incomeÞ .220*** .247*** .249*** .295***
ð.079Þ ð.086Þ ð.082Þ ð.105Þ
Lnð junior female incomeÞ .072 .068 .100 .092
ð.055Þ ð.063Þ ð.064Þ ð.080Þ
1994 year dummy .449* .467 .227 .269
ð.268Þ ð.298Þ ð.368Þ ð.419Þ
x2 tests:
x2: coefficient for household head 5 junior male 3.173 2.843 8.154 6.97
Prob > x2 .07 .09 .00 .01
x2: coefficient for household head 5 female 6.448 6.568 16.14 15.16
Prob > x2 .01 .01 .00 .00
x2: coefficient for junior male 5 female 2.086 2.26 1.428 1.563
Prob > x2 .15 .13 .23 .21
Hansen J-test for overidentification:
x2ð7Þ 4.276 4.003 5.008 4.645
Prob > x2 .75 .78 .66 .70
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 6.568 6.568 6.568 6.568
Note. 2SLS 5 two-stage least squares; LIML5 limited information maximum likelihood. In the top portion
of the table, standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the household level across the two
time periods.
* Significant at the 10% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
Kazianga and Wahhaj 563chi-square tests, we can reject the null hypothesis of equality between the
household head and the junior male coefficients and between the household
head and junior female coefficients at the 1% level. The null hypothesis of
equality between the coefficients for the junior male and junior female house-
hold members cannot be rejected.
We report the Cragg-Donald Wald test statistics at the bottom of table 6.
We can reject the null that the 2SLS bias may exceed 20% of the OLS
bias ða statistic of 6.57 vs. a critical value of 5.83Þ but not that it exceeds
10% of the OLS bias.10 Therefore, weak instrument bias may be a concern
with our 2SLS estimates. To address this concern, we estimate the model using
limited information maximum likelihood ðLIMLÞ, a procedure that is known
to be more robust to weak instruments than 2SLS ðStock et al. 2002; Stock
10 For the case of three endogenous variables and 10 excluded instruments, the critical values for the
null that the IVE bias may exceed 20%, 10%, or 5% of the OLS bias are 5.83, 9.64, and 16.80,
respectively. For tabulation of the critical values, see Stock and Yogo ð2005, 100Þ.
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564 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eand Yogo 2005Þ. The LIML estimates shown in column 4 of table 6 are
consistent with the 2SLS estimates shown in column 1. Moreover, we have ex-
actly the pattern of rejection from the chi-square tests.
The Cragg-Donald test statistic for LIML, reported in the last row of
table 6, column 4, is 6.57. Stock and Yogo do not provide a critical value for
LIML with more than one endogenous variable. However, Bernal and Keane
ð2011Þ argue that the critical value for the null that the bias for the LIML
test statistics is no greater than 10% of the OLS bias is roughly 5.4 in a
model with three endogenous variables and 78 instruments. Given that the
critical value increases with the number of instruments, it is apparent that in
our case—three endogenous variables with 10 instruments—the critical value
for rejecting the null, that the LIML statistic is no greater than 10% of the
OLS bias, is smaller than 5.4 . This value is easily exceeded by our Cragg-
Donald statistic of 6.57. Thus, there is no evidence of weak instrument bias
with the LIML estimates.
Because our equations are overidentified, we can test whether the ex-
cluded instruments are appropriately independent of the error terms. There-
fore, we present the Hansen J-test for overidentification. In both cases, we
cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid at the
10% level. This supports the plausibility that our instruments are “truly” ex-
ogenous and can be excluded from the second-stage regressions.
Overall, it is apparent that the household head has a higher marginal
propensity to spend on household public goods out of income from farms
managed by himself or herself than do the junior household members. In this
case, the household members would have a stronger incentive to provide
labor on the fields managed by the household head than on the private plots
of the other household members, and this can explain the pattern of allo-
cation family labor across household plots described in the preceding section.
The results are also consistent with the reasoning underlying the model of
voluntary contributions under a social norm presented in Section III.B.
However the estimated coefficients do not match exactly with the predic-
tions of the model, and therefore we discuss briefly why. First, the model
predicts that, for household public goods, the coefficient pxc in ð14Þ should
equal one. However, if we allow for intertemporal savings within the model,
then an argument akin to the Permanent Income Hypothesis should imply
that a temporary income shock, as rainfall variations would produce, should
not lead to a one-for-one change in expenditures, even if the household head
is socially obliged to spend the proceeds from his ðcommonÞ farm plots on
household public goods. This would explain why p̂xc < 1 in the second-stage
regression. Second, the model predicts that pxm 5 pxf 5 0 ðwith x denotingThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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Kazianga and Wahhaj 565expenditures on household public goodsÞ. However, if there are multiple
household public goods, and the corner solution in consumption expendi-
tures assumed in Section III.B applies to only a subset of them, this would
explain why we obtain pxm > 0 and pxf > 0.
We report the estimated coefficients for total household expenditures
ðeq. 13Þ in columns 1 and 2 in table 6.We obtain similar values for the Cragg-
Donald weak instruments test and the Hansen J-test for overidentification
as with equation ð14Þ and therefore conclude that there is no evidence for
weak instrument bias or invalidity of the instruments. The estimated coef-
ficients for total expenditures are somewhat smaller than the corresponding
estimates for household public goods, although the differences are not sta-
tistically significant in every case. Thus, there is some evidence that house-
hold members are able to smooth expenditures on private goods better than
for household public goods. We test for efficiency in consumption expendi-
tures using equation ð15Þ for the category household public goods as defined
above. The null hypothesis of efficiency is strongly rejected, with a Wald sta-
tistic of 18.32 and a p-value of .00038.
We should note that, according to the estimates in table 4, the common
plot, on average, uses all types of family labor more intensively than private
plots managed by household members of either gender. This suggests that the
marginal product of family labor is higher on a private plot than on a house-
hold common plot. But if so, can the promise of household public goods be
sufficient inducement for an individual, with his or her own parcel of land,
to work on the common plot? Could he ðsheÞ not provide the public good
more cheaply by allocating more of his ðherÞ labor to his ðherÞ private plot at
the expense of the common plot and using the proceeds to pay for the public
good?
We offer two possible answers to this question. First, the pattern of allo-
cation of family labor suggests that the model of voluntary labor contribu-
tions is not capturing all the tools at the disposal of the household head to
induce family members to work on the common plot; that is, the patriarch
can threaten or coax them in ways not captured in the model.
A second explanation is that labor activities on the common plot follow a
more specialized division of family labor than the private plots. If the family
members are given specific and well-defined tasks on the common plot, than
any withdrawal of labor could have a significant impact on production. If so,
the marginal product of each person’s labor may be higher on the common
plot than on his or her private plot, even if the common plot is being farmed
more intensively. This may happen even if the labor inputs of different family
members are close substitutes in terms of the production possibility set. Un-This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
566 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Efortunately, in the absence of more detailed information on labor activities
on farm plots, it is not possible to verify the second hypothesis.
E. Female Headship
To determine whether the pattern of production and consumption previ-
ously discussed also extends to female-headed households, we reestimate equa-
tions ð7Þ and ð12Þ with separate dummies for male and female household
heads. The plot-level data includes 67 observations where the plot manager
is a female household head. The estimated coefficients for the main variables
of interest are shown in table 7. In the case of plot yields, the estimated co-
efficient for the female head dummy is smaller than that of the male head and
larger than that of a junior male household member. However, because of
large standard errors, the difference is not statistically significant in either case.
In the case of the allocation of family labor, we find that the male and
female household heads have similar levels of labor intensity in the case of
both adult male and adult female labor. Interestingly, the female head uses
child labor much more intensively than the male head, with the difference
being statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that some of the
female-headed households consist of widowed grandmothers living with, pos-
sibly orphaned, grandchildren. The female household head also uses all types
of family labor more intensively than junior male and female members of the
same household, but the differences are not statistically significant in every
caseÞ. Therefore, there is some suggestive evidence that female-headed house-
holds exhibit, broadly, similar patterns in the allocation of productive re-
sources as the male-headed households, at least along the dimensions mea-
sured. But given the small sample size, these results are, at best, tentative.TABLE 7
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS
Dependent Variable:
LnðLabor Days per Unit Area
on Plot of LandÞ
Dependent Variable: LnðPlot YieldÞ Male Labor Female Labor Child Labor
Junior male dummy .021 1.216 21.164 .206
ð.12Þ ð.14Þ ð.13Þ ð.13Þ
Male head dummy .778 2.185 .517 .790
ð.11Þ ð.12Þ ð.11Þ ð.11Þ
Female head dummy .377 1.658 .582 1.348
ð.75Þ ð.48Þ ð.44Þ ð.46Þ
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Kazianga and Wahhaj 567VII. Testing for Alternative Hypotheses
A. Unobserved Plot Characteristics
In this section we consider a number of alternative explanations for the dif-
ferences in agricultural yields between common plots and private plots. First,
we explore the possibility that the yield differentials across different types of
plot managers shown in table 3 are being driven by unobserved plot char-
acteristics. Although the regression controls for available plot characteristics,
it should be noted that the information on soil quality and toposequence
available in the CEDRES/Laval data set, which we use, is very limited. When
considering the same question, Udry ð1996Þ showed that when controls for
plot characteristics are removed, the gender differential in yields disappear,
implying that female plots are of better quality than male plots, at least along
the dimensions we are able to observe. In the CEDRES/Laval data set, we
obtain a similar pattern, as shown in table 8. If soil quality, toposequence,
and plot location are removed from the plot yield equation but plot size is
retained, the coefficient for household headship is similar in magnitude to
that in the original specification and statistically significant at the 5% level. If
all plot characteristics are removed, then the corresponding coefficient is only
one-fifth as large as in the original specification and no longer statistically
significant. The differential between junior male and junior female plots re-
mains small and statistically insignificant in both these alternative specifica-
tions. These results imply that the farm plots managed by the junior house-
hold members are, in fact, of better quality than ðin terms of plot sizeÞ or of
similar quality to ðin terms of soil quality, toposequence, and locationÞ, those
managed by the head of the household along the dimensions observed. This
evidence goes against the hypothesis that the yield advantage of household
heads may be due to unobserved differences in plot quality.
B. Varying Distance to Farm Plots
Second, we note that some farm plots are at a considerable distance from the
homestead of the household responsible for its cultivation. In these circum-
stances, the cost of traveling to the plot may be nonnegligible and therefore, as
Udry ð1996Þ shows formally, applying labor inputs with varying levels of
intensity on plots with similar characteristics planted with the same crops may
be consistent with efficiency in household production. For example, to save
on traveling time, it may be efficient for one household member to apply all
his labor to a farm plot that lies 2 kilometers east of the homestead, while
another applies all her labor to a farm plot which lies 2 kilometers west, even if
their labor inputs are not perfect substitutes.This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Junior male dummy 2.0619 .122 2.0419 .0127 .123
Male household head dummy .1502 .090 .6948 .7747 .105
Plot size ð1st decile omittedÞ:
2nd decile 2.6984 .143 2.6671 .149
3rd decile 2.4548 .149 2.4843 .156
4th decile 2.8705 .155 2.9434 .162
5th decile 21.1463 .153 21.208 .162
6th decile 21.3222 .165 21.447 .175
7th decile 21.2102 .163 21.254 .171
8th decile 21.5405 .170 21.616 .181
9th decile 21.6982 .167 21.854 .182
10th decile 21.9068 .169 22.037 .178
Toposequence ðmid-slope omittedÞ:
Near bottom 2.492 .268
Plain 2.461 .250





Outside village .0225 .104
Observations 2,068 2,068 1,967
Note.Dependent variable5 lnðplot yield in CFA francsÞ. Household-crop-year fixed effects are included in
each regression.
568 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EHowever, even if the cost of traveling to distant farm plots were a significant
factor, the above reasoning would not apply to those located close to the
homestead. Efficiency would still imply similar yields across plots with similar
characteristics, planted to the same crops, if they are near the homestead.
This appears not to be the case in the data. Table 9 shows that the difference
in yields between plots farmed by the household head and those farmed by
other household members continue to hold when we restrict the sample to
plots less than 4 kilometers, 3 kilometers, 2 kilometers, or 1 kilometer from
the homestead. This pattern is very similar to that obtained by Udry ð1996Þ.
C. Misspecification of the Relationship between Yield and Plot Size
Next, we consider the possibility that the estimated yield differential across
plots managed by different household members, shown in table 3, may be
driven in part by a misspecification of the relationship between yield and plot
size. In particular, if the relationship between yield and plot size varies across
common and private plots, then, following Udry’s reasoning, this may lead toThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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TABLE 9
ESTIMATED YIELD DIFFERENTIAL ACROSS DIFFERENT PLOT MANAGERS BY DISTANCE TO HOMESTEAD














dummy .0127 2.0182 .0186 .0727 .0184 .0200
ð.123Þ ð.133Þ ð.140Þ ð.152Þ ð.166Þ ð.183Þ
Male head
dummy .7747 .7553 .7623 .7518 .7161 .6949
ð.105Þ ð.113Þ ð.116Þ ð.123Þ ð.140Þ ð.156Þ
N 1,967 1,782 1,697 1,595 1,452 1,215
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Kazianga and Wahhaj 569an overestimate of the slope of the yield-versus-plot-size relationship and an
upward bias in the estimated yield differential between the household head’s
plots and those managed by other household members. Following Udry
ð1996Þ, we perform a nonparametric regression of plot yields on plot size,
controlling for household-crop-year fixed effects for three categories of house-
hold members: household heads, junior males, and junior females.
The results are shown in figure 2. We find that for plots larger than 0.4 hect-
ares, the yields on the plots managed by the junior household members are
consistently below those managed by the household head. For plots smaller than
0.4 hectares, the yields across the three types of plots are similar. The latterFigure 2. Nonparametric regression of plot yield on plot area with household-year-crop fixed effects
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570 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Efinding is consistent with the idea that the smaller plots managed by the
household head are actually private plots, which we cannot distinguish from
the common plots in our data. If so, the observed pattern remains consistent
with the predictions of the model introduced in Section III.B but inconsistent
with efficiency.
D. Direct Impact of Rainfall on Household Consumption
As noted in Section III.D, if rainfall affects household consumption patterns
directly, independently of its effects on household income, then this will
lead to a bias in the estimated coefficients for equations ð13Þ and ð14Þ and
invalidate the test of overidentification in ð15Þ. We discuss here the validity
of these assumptions.
First, we noted that if price changes are correlated with rainfall, then we
may be capturing the effect of price changes in our estimates of the effects of
household agricultural income on consumption expenditures. In the absence
of good information on local prices, we cannot test whether they are indeed
correlated with rainfall patterns. However, we can argue, in theoretical terms,
that our results are unlikely to be driven by bias arising from such corre-
lation. If the correlation relates to prices of inputs or outputs of farm pro-
duction, then they are accounted for in our measures of farm plot incomes.
Changes in these prices affect consumption via farm income and, therefore,
such correlation would not violate the exclusion restriction. However, corre-
lation between rainfall patterns and the prices of consumption goods can
directly affect consumption expenditures. But, to the extent that rainfall af-
fects farm output from each type of plot in broadly similar ways, such cor-
relation on its own would lead to similar estimated effects for all three sources
of income on household public goods, which is contrary to what we find.
Another possibility highlighted in Section III.D was that the household’s
demand for certain consumption goods is sensitive to weather variations ðaf-
ter controlling for household incomeÞ and that these effects are included in
our estimates of ð13Þ and ð14Þ. These effects could lead to a reject of the test
of overidentification in ð15Þ even if there is efficiency in household consump-
tion; but, once again, it would not explain why the coefficient for income
from the household head’s plots is larger than the corresponding coefficient
for the junior members’ plots.
Another potential issue is that labor demand is sensitive to variations in
rainfall. This would not affect our estimates if there are perfect labor markets
or if leisure is separable from other consumption goods in the utility function.
But if both if these assumptions fail, then rainfall patterns would also directly
influence household demand for consumption goods. Therefore, we testThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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TABLE 10
LABOR SUPPLY AND RAINFALL
Fitted Values from First Stage Male Family Labor Female Family Labor
Lnðhousehold head incomeÞ 2.095** 2.150**
ð.041Þ ð.064Þ
Lnð junior male incomeÞ 2.052* 2.078**
ð.028Þ ð.037Þ
Lnð junior female IncomeÞ 2.042** 2.029
ð.018Þ ð.023Þ
1994 year dummy 214.308** 219.525**
ð5.774Þ ð8.422Þ
Test for all coefficients being jointly significant F-statistic 2.47 1.89
Note.Observations5 473. Dependent variable5 lnðtotal labor days used by householdÞ. Standard errors,
shown in parentheses, are clustered at the household level across the two time periods.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
Kazianga and Wahhaj 571whether labor demand responds to rainfall patterns, using data on the house-
hold’s use of family labor. The results are shown in table 10.11 There is some
evidence that a change in rainfall that positively affects income from farm
plots managed by the household head or by junior male or female household
members may cause a decline in the household’s use of male and female
family labor. An F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all the
rainfall variables equal zero has a p-value of .0621 in the case of male family
labor and a p-value of .1311 in the case of female family labor.
Therefore, it is possible that the increase in expenditures on household
public goods noted earlier is not caused by an increase in income per se but, at
least in part, by increased leisure enjoyed by adult household members when
the level of rainfall is beneficial for farm output. However, we shall argue that,
in spite of this caveat, the estimated coefficients in table 10 remain broadly
consistent with the hypothesis discussed in Section III.B. According to the
estimates in table 10, a rainfall shock that leads to a 10% increase in income
from the household head’s plot would cause male family labor to decline by
0.9% and female family labor to decline by 1.5%. The corresponding effects
for income from plots managed by junior female and junior male members are
roughly half as large. Thus, compared to other household farm plots, a pos-
itive rainfall shock on the household head’s plot leads to a greater enjoyment
of leisure by adult household members and also ðaccording to the results in
table 6Þ greater enjoyment of household public goods. In this sense, the pic-
ture remains that the gains on the head’s plots are more widely distributed11 We do not provide corresponding results for child labor and nonfamily labor because of the high
frequency of observations for which these inputs equal zero.
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572 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ewithin the household, as suggested by the ethnographic literature. And if this
is so, the argument that household members have a stronger incentive to
work on the common plots remains consistent with the evidence. It is also
the case that the impact of rainfall on labor use is roughly half as large as
the corresponding effect on household public goods. Therefore, it seems un-
likely that the pattern of expenditures on household public goods observed
in table 6 can be accounted for entirely by changes in leisure, with no ex-
planatory role for increased income.
VIII. Conclusion
Empirical studies of households in developing countries have repeatedly
found that the allocation of resources within the household is correlated with
gender. By contrast, theories of intrahousehold allocation, for the most part,
have remained gender-blind. The household is treated as a collection of agents
with distinct preferences but with no a priori difference between a man and a
woman.
In this article, we suggest that some of the gender-related patterns observed
in the empirical investigation of households may be explained by the fact that
the head of the household, who is bestowed with authority over as well as
responsibilities toward the other members of the household by existing social
norms, is in most instances male. We suggest that gender-related patterns in
the allocation of resources within the household can be explained without
resorting to any assumption of innate differences in preferences or power
between men and women but rather by differences in their positions created
by social norms. The key piece of evidence we provide for this argument is
that, for agricultural households in Burkina Faso, yields on plots owned by
men who are not household heads are similar to those achieved on plots
owned by women in the same household ðcontrolling for plot characteristics
and the crops plantedÞ, while yields achieved by household heads ðwho are,
in most instances, maleÞ are significantly higher.
The variations in plot yields can be accounted for by the pattern of labor
allocation within the household: both male and female household members
provide significant amounts of labor to the farm plots managed by the house-
hold head but substantially less labor on plots managed by junior household
members of the opposite gender. This pattern of labor allocation does not
appear to be Pareto efficient. However, the pattern is consistent with a scenario
where family labor is offered voluntarily and to the farm plots where one
calculates the greatest benefit for oneself. If the household head is obliged, by
social norms, to provide for household public goods using the proceeds fromThis content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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Kazianga and Wahhaj 573his farm plots, then the junior household members would have much stronger
incentives to work for the household head than on some other household
plot over which he or she has no claim. This explanation finds substantial
support in the ethnographic literature, which describes a distinction between
common and private plots belonging to the same household and the differ-
ent rules that apply in each case. Finally, in support of this explanation, we
show that the head of the household has, indeed, a higher propensity to spend
on household public goods out of his agricultural income than do the other
household members.
The hypothesis and evidence provided in this article naturally beg the
question whether female-headed households exhibit the same pattern of be-
havior as male-headed households. This is also related to the following, broader
question: if the pattern of allocation of productive resources and consumption
expenditures within a household is heavily influenced by patriarchal norms of
responsibilities and obligations, do these norms extend to settings where there
is no longer a patriarch, as traditionally defined? The small number of female-
headed households in our sample means that we are not able to answer this
question satisfactorily with the available data. Therefore, it remains an open
question to be explored in future research.This content downloaded from 139.078.028.086 on March 19, 2019 14:47:29 PM
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TABLE A1
HOUSEHOLD PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOODSExpenditure ItemThis
All use subject to UnProportion of Reported
Purchases Intended for All/
Other Household Members content downloaded from 13
iversity of Chicago Press TeExpenditure Item9.078.028.086 on Marc
rms and Conditions (httProportion of Reported
Purchases Intended for All/
Other Household MembersFresh vegetables 1.000 Lantern .695
Raw meat 1.000 Cooked rice .577
Cooking oil 1.000 Millet doughnut .547
Lantern 1.000 Clothing and shoes .521
Social events .988 Millet porridge .512
Cereals .987 Red sorghum product .500
Sweet potatoes .982 Fresh fruits .500
Other nut grains .972 Cooked meat .500
Sesame-grain .970 Coffee .462
Millet-grain .968 Sugar .450
White sorghum-
grain .968 Corn porridge .333
Bread .960 Peanuts .333
Salt .956 Honey .324
Red sorghum .940 Misc. durable goods .319
Millet flour .935 Motorbike .308
White sorghum-
flour .932 Local beer .298Cassava .911 Tea .244
Rice-grain .896 Transportation costs .230
Other condiments
and spices .882 Eggs .222
Kitchen utensils .878 Cooked bean
products .184
Bicycle .738 Other alcoholic
beverages .182
Cooked millet
couscous .709 Soft beverages .000Note. The table shows the proportion of all reported purchases in each expenditure category that were
intended for “all” or “other” household members, in the 1994 household expenditures survey. The cut-off
used for identifying household public goods is .750.
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